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Abstract
In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation 
to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for  the 
justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief 
share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. 
At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require 
the truth of content conceptualism, while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the 
second part, based on Alva Noë’s actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less 
intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and 
then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception 
holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational 
concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call ‘space of actions’ to the logical space of 
reasons.
Keywords: Alva Noë, cognitive penetrability, conceptualism, internalism, perceptual justification, 
sensorimotor theories of perception.
1. Introduction
The debate regarding the nature of the content of perceptual experience has assumed new forms over recent decades with the introduction of the question of whether this content is conceptual or non-concep-
tual.1 This metaphysical question about the nature of perception is generally 
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1. The idea that perceptual experience contains non-conceptual content was initially 
introduced by Gareth Evans. He claims that our mental structure has two systems, 
the informational and the cognitive, the sub-personal and the personal, respectively. 
Perception and memory are part of the informational system. A function of the first, 
for example, is providing the cognitive system with information about the surrounding 
environment. On the other hand, thought and the ability to judge are part of the 
cognitive system. One of the reasons for Evans’ defense of the notion that perception 
contains non-conceptual content is that he holds perception to be separate from belief. 
Later, we will discuss whether this hypothesis excludes any form of conceptualism. See 
Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 123-24.
*
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posed by another, which is of an epistemic character: how can perceptual 
experience justify beliefs about our surroundings? John McDowell holds 
that if experience does not already have conceptual content to present 
the world as being a certain way, thus leading to a shared link between 
perception and thought, then it is difficult to see how experience could 
justify a belief,2 especially if we, like McDowell, understand justification in 
internalist terms. In opposition to this position, Athanassios Raftopoulos 
claims that if perceptual experience intrinsically involves concepts and, 
therefore, is cognitively penetrated, then experience is not independent of 
our deeply held beliefs; and, as a result, it cannot operate as an impartial 
court for justification,3 since the supporting evidence provided by expe-
rience is epistemologically biased  by our own beliefs.4 
In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience holds 
a rational relation with empirical thought. In the first part, I will elab-
orate two claims that seem central to explaining the justificational role 
of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief 
share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is inde-
pendent from belief. I show how difficult it is to reconcile these claims. 
The first one seems to require the content view of conceptualism, while 
the second one seems to imply its rejection. I argue that John McDowell 
fails in doing justice to the second claim in Mind and World, although he 
thinks otherwise. In the second part, based on Alva Noë’s actionist theory 
of perception, I support a less intellectualist reading of the first claim, 
uncommitted to the content conceptualism, and show how it can be 
reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds 
rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise 
of observational concepts. These concepts, being learned at the interface 
between perception and cognition, connect what I propose to call ‘space 
of actions’ to the logical space of reasons. This actionist approach to the 
justificational role of perceptual experience is intended to doing justice to 
internalism. 
2. John McDowEll, Mind and World (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 52-3.
3. Athanassios Raftopoulos, “The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-
Ladenness,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 46, (2015): 91. 
4. Susan Siegel provides the following example: suppose that S believes, for no good 
reason, that R is upset with her. Upon meeting R, due to her belief, S sees R as being 
upset with her. Based on her experience, S believes even more firmly that R is upset 
with her. See Susan siEgEl, “Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification,” Noûs 
46, no. 2 (2012): 210. 
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2. Preliminary Considerations
Since Heck,5 it is common to distinguish between two versions of 
conceptualism: the state view and the content view. The first is a thesis 
about representational states or vehicles, and maintains that for a mental 
state to carry the representation of a state of things, of an object, or of a 
property, the subject of this mental state must have the concepts required 
to specify this state of things, this object, or this property.6 The non-con-
ceptualist claims that perceptual states can carry representation without 
the subject of these states possessing the concepts required for specifying 
the content of this representation. The second is a thesis about the content 
of the representations, which is the intentional object of a representation. 
The content conceptualist claims that the content of mental representa-
tions is or can be articulated conceptually, i.e., the content of a perception 
is propositionally structured. The non-conceptualist claims that there is 
or can be perceptual content that is not conceptually articulated or not 
even articulable conceptually. The state non-conceptualist does not need 
to commit to the non-conceptualism of content, but the reverse does not 
seem possible. Note that to the state non-conceptualist, the content of a 
representation can be shared by conceptual and non-conceptual represen-
tations; perceptions and beliefs can have the same type of content, even if 
the states differ in relation to dependence on the possession of concepts. 
3. The shared content and the problem of the intelligible interface
To prevent empirical thought from being represented “as a fric-
tionless spinning in a void”,7 we must have a concept of experience that 
enables our empirical beliefs to be responsive to the world. In essence, for 
the world to constrain our empirical beliefs, experience must present it as 
being a certain way and accessible to thought. This seems to require that 
there be something in common between the way we think about the world 
and the way that experience presents the world to us. This would be the 
5. Richard HEck, “Nonconceptual content and the space of reasons,” The Philosophical 
Review 109, (2000): 483–523.
6. The state view may be weakened by requiring only that the subject have the capability 
to acquire the concepts necessary for specifying the content of representation.
7. John McDowEll, Mind and World, 11.  
Provided for Personal License use. Not for reproduction, distribution, or commercial use.
© 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All Rights Reserved.
Author's Personal Copy
Eros Moreira de Carvalho548
2016
Vol. 72
Fasc. 2-3
shared content thesis, which recurrently appears in the literature on the 
topic:
it is only because experience involves capacities belonging to spontaneity 
that we can understand experience as awareness, or apparent awareness, 
of aspects of the world at all.8  
judgments and experience can diverge and even contradict one another. 
But to say that they can be in conflict is to say that it can be in accord; 
and this would seem to show that they have the same sort of content.9
For the one major virtue of thinking of perceptions as propositional atti-
tudes is that it makes it easy to see how they might intelligibly interface, 
in virtue of their contents, with other states of mind.10
The shared content thesis captures two requirements, one weaker, 
and the other stronger, which seem central to the justificational role of 
perceptual experience. First, that which experience presents to us must 
be able to point to the truth or falsehood of our empirical beliefs. In this 
sense, experience and thought can be directed to the same things. Second, 
whatever experience presents to us, it must do so intelligibly, i.e., in a 
way that enables recognition or understanding of the relevance of what is 
perceptually presented to the truth of what is thought or believed.
The first requirement claims that there must be a truth-indicating 
relationship between a perceptual state and a belief if the former, due to 
its content, justifies the latter. The truth conditions of the belief must be 
partially or completely satisfied by what is presented to us perceptually. 
If our perceptual beliefs deal with facts or events that are witnessed, and 
with surrounding three-dimensional objects and their properties, then 
the first requirement favors a conception of experiences according to 
which facts and objects are presented to us perceptually. Otherwise, as 
in the case of a sense-data theory of experience, in order to satisfy the 
first requirement, we would have to either show how facts and objects are 
constructed from sensations or establish principles that connect sensa-
tions to the distal objects or occurrences that caused them. I make the 
assumption that our ordinary perceptual beliefs deal with events and the 
surrounding three-dimensional objects. The first requirement alone is not 
8. Ibid., 47.
9. Alva noë, Action in Perception (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006), 189. 
10. Daniel Hutto, and Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic minds without content 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 103, emphasis ours. 
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sufficient for requiring the state view and only perhaps the content view 
if we assume that the content of beliefs is articulated conceptually. For 
perceptual experience to be among the relata of the truth-indicating rela-
tionship, it is sufficient that the content of a perceptual state can also be 
the content of a belief. It does not matter that perception and belief are 
different kinds of mental states. Only the content non-conceptualist would 
have some hard time explaining the truth-indicating relationship under 
the assumption that the content of beliefs is articulated conceptually.11 
Conceptualism takes on a more attractive position in the epistemo-
logical debate when we consider the second requirement. It holds that 
there must be a rational relation between a perceptual state and a belief if 
the former, due to its content, justifies the latter. Experience must constrain 
our attitude regarding a proposition rationally, rather than just causally. 
Therefore, the subject must be capable of recognizing the relevance of what 
experience presents to the truth of the proposition considered. It is easy 
to understand how this recognition is possible if our conceptual abilities 
are already operating in perceptual experience. If experience, for example, 
delivers an object from the field of vision as a notebook then, due to the 
inferential connections that the concept of notebook has with others, the 
subject can recognize the relevance of this experience to the truth of the 
proposition that there is a notebook, that electronic equipment is present, 
or that this object is not an animal, etc. That experience presents us with 
an object in a manner that can be retrieved in a series of thoughts about 
the object makes the normative relationship between experience and 
belief intelligible, since it explains how the subject can, if it were sensitive 
to the inferential connections of the concepts operating in experience, 
adopt a rational attitude in relation to the proposition considered. This 
is why McDowell claims that concepts must already be operating in expe-
rience. Otherwise, as Sellars had already pointed out, we find ourselves 
committed to the myth of the given,12 or, as Hutto and Myin point out, 
we make the rational relationship between experience and propositional 
attitudes mysterious, which creates the problem of the intelligible inter-
11. It is not trivial that the content of beliefs and propositional attitudes are conceptually 
articulated. stalnakER, for example, maintains that the content of beliefs and perceptual 
states must be individualized by means of classes of possible worlds. To him, the 
conceptualist debate is only valid in relation to representational states or vehicles. See 
Robert stalnakER, “What might nonconceptual content be?,” Philosophical Issues 9, 
(1998): 339-352.
12. Wilfrid sEllaRs, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and 
Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-196.
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face.13 Thus, a perceptual experience justifies a belief not just when there 
is a truth-indicating relationship between them but also a rational rela-
tionship; the subject must acknowledge the relevance of the content of 
her experience for the truth of the proposition considered. Moreover, this 
acknowledgment seems to require that the subject be able to think the 
judgment that the content of the perceptual experience is relevant to the 
truth of the considered proposition, which, in turn, seems to require that 
experiences have propositional content. The relevance at issue is noted 
by the subject by means of the inferential connections of the concepts 
that figure in the propositional content of experience and of the propo-
sition considered. Thus, content conceptualism seems to be necessary to 
properly explain the justificational role of perceptual experience. 
The conceptualist position can sound very intellectualist, and it 
must sound so if we assume that the concepts are actively operating in 
experience, i.e., just as they are operating when we deliberate. However, 
McDowell, as early as in Mind and World, claims that concepts are oper-
ating passively in perception.14 It is not quite clear what he means by this. 
In a negative sense, it at least means that a perceptual episode does not 
involve the reflexive application of concepts; it only involves the current 
operation of concepts: “having things appear to one a certain way is 
already itself a mode of actual operation of conceptual capacities”.15 Even 
so, McDowell’s position would be intellectualist enough by not attributing 
a normative role to the experience of creatures that lack the appropriate 
concepts or by suspending the normative role of the experiences of crea-
tures that, for some reason, do not passively put into operation the appro-
priate conceptual abilities in perceptual experience.16 
13. Daniel Hutto, and Erick Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic minds without content, 104. 
14. John McDowEll, Mind and World, 62.
15. Ibid., 62. The fact that in Mind and World McDowell does not discuss in greater detail the 
passive operating of concepts in experience casts a shadow over how well his position 
meets the second requirement discussed above. How does the passive application 
of concepts solve the problem of the interface and explain the acknowledgment 
of the relevance of the content of experience for a considered proposition? If the 
passive application of concepts were automatic and executed through sub-personal 
mechanisms, it is not clear how it would involve or implicate the recognition referred 
to. 
16. In more recent articles, McDowell has substantially weakened his conceptualist 
position, to the point of no longer requiring concepts to be in operation in the perceptive 
act itself. Due to space constraints, we will not compare his more recent position 
with the one I will develop based on noë’s theory of perception. See John McDowEll, 
“Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” in Having the World in View (Massachusetts: Harvard 
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An externalist in terms of the justification can easily avoid the intel-
lectualist disadvantage by setting aside the second requirement. However, 
she has to face the challenge of showing how her concept of justification 
is relevant to our understanding of epistemic agency. I do not intend to 
support the internalist views of justification in opposition to the exter-
nalist ones in this paper. My narrower aim is to show that it is possible 
to defend a minimally internalist view of justification that is compatible 
with the thesis of independence and that has no undesirable intellectualist 
consequences. 
4. The independence of perception in relation to belief and the 
problem of cognitive penetrability
If we had reasons to believe that the way that perceptual experience 
presents the world to us is itself determined by our beliefs or by any other 
higher cognitive states, then we would have to reject that perceptual expe-
rience can improve the epistemic quality of our beliefs. Following Susan 
Siegel’s formulation for cognitive penetrability, if two persons who are 
aware of the same region of space and being bombarded by the same distal 
stimulus have perceptions with different content and relevantly different 
beliefs or superior cognitive states, then these superior cognitive states are 
causally responsible for the content of these perceptual states.17 Cognitively 
penetrated experience seems to imply a vicious circle; therefore, although 
it does not bar the possibility that experience can rationally support a 
belief, it creates an obstacle for our thinking that it increases the epis-
temic authority of the belief supported by an experience of this kind. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to defend that the justificational role of 
University Press, 2013), 256-274. 
17. Susana siEgEl, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification,” 207. It is worth 
noting that the relevant causal influence for characterizing the cognitive penetrability 
should be one that acts upon the content of the experience. It is possible to accept, and 
there is empirical evidence for accepting, pre-perceptual causal influence (i.e., beliefs 
and expectations that causally determine where to drive the focus of our attention) and 
post-perceptual influence (i.e., beliefs and expectations that causally determine the 
exercise of recognition skills on the perceptions previously delivered by the perceptual 
system). These cases of causal influence do not threaten the epistemological role of 
perceptual experience. See Athanassios Raftopoulos, “The Cognitive Impenetrability 
of Perception and Theory-Ladenness,” 91, and Zenon pylysHyn,  Seeing and Visualizing: 
It’s Not What You Think (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), 79-85. 
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perceptual experience also depends on the independence of perception in 
relation to belief18:
because the way one sees the world is largely independent of one’s theo-
retical attachments, it is possible to see that the predictions – even of 
theories that one likes a lot – aren’t coming out.19 
Nor is the case that, when one has a visual experience, say, one must even 
be inclined to judge things to be the way the experience presents them as 
being. Experience is belief-independent[…].20  
If what one sees depends on what one believes, people with different 
commitments see different worlds. And if there is no neutral basis on 
which matters of meaning could be resolved, how could these people 
communicate?21
Basically, the independence claim captures the requirement that 
perceptual experience present the world as it really is, so that it may act 
as a court for our empirical beliefs. What we must investigate is whether 
the independence thesis is incompatible with the conceptualism required 
by the shared content claim. If it is, then the dilemma introduced at the 
beginning of this article is inevitable, and the minimal internalism that I 
am trying to articulate is simply not feasible. 
In the previous section, I highlighted that the shared content claim, 
according to a reading on how experience can rationally constrain 
empirical thought, requires the truth of content conceptualism. When the 
concepts are operating within a judgment, other cognitive states ratio-
nally constrain the application of these concepts due to their inferential 
connections. For example, if I am looking at a mug that seems red to me 
and I consider the proposition that it is red, I can abstain from applying 
the concept of red to the mug if I am informed that the environment I am 
18. A second reason why experience is independent from belief is that in contexts where 
it is called upon for deciding between competing theories, its content must be neutral 
in relation to the competing theories, i.e., the scientist’s commitment to one theory or 
another must not cognitively penetrate the experiences that will serve as testimony 
for deciding the debate between competing theories, since, otherwise, we would have 
a clear case of bias. See Jery foDoR, “Burge on Perception,” in The Conceptual Mind: 
New Directions in the Study of Concepts, eds. Eric Marglils, and Stephen Laurence 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015), 24.
19. Jery foDoR, “Burge on Perception,” 42. 
20. Alva noë, Action in Perception, 188. 
21. Athanassios Raftopoulos, “The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-
Ladenness,” 91.
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in is full of red light. In fact, the very nature of belief is that it should be 
under rational control and, therefore, sensitive to the individual’s other 
cognitive states.22 It is to be expected that the content of a judgment is 
cognitively penetrate, i.e., that the content of other cognitive states ratio-
nally constrains and, as a result, causally determines the content of the 
belief formed. If this were the model for how concepts passively operate 
in perceptual experience, then it would be difficult to deny the conclusion 
that experience is cognitively penetrated. 
In discussing Gareth Evans’s argument for the claim that perception 
is independent from belief, McDowell accepts Evans’s criticism that the 
model of active operating of the concepts is unsuitable for understanding 
perception.23 This model is inadequate even from a phenomenological 
standpoint. It would be wrong to construe McDowell as suggesting that 
conceptual capabilities actively operate in perception, just as occurs in a 
deliberate judgment. Thus, McDowell seems to think that his position is 
not incompatible with the claim that perception is independent from belief 
if we consider that the conceptual capacities passively operate on experi-
ence.24 At least, in this case, there would not be influence from beliefs 
brought to awareness, as occurs in a deliberate judgment. However, it is 
not clear that there would be no cognitive influence on the determination 
of perceptual content, even in this way. Even assuming that the function 
of conceptual capabilities in perception is passive and unconscious, if 
they share the same inferential structure as the capabilities that actively 
operate in judging, then there is no surprise in the fact that information 
and beliefs stored in long-term memory can influence the determination 
of the content of the perceptual experience. Whether this influence is 
conscious or not bears no relevance on cognitive penetrability. McDowell 
does not seem to foresee this possibility, since he does not provide an 
answer for it. 
Another possibility would be to maintain that perception can involve 
concepts in a way that would not imply that experience is cognitively pene-
trated. This possibility could be realized by encapsulated concepts, i.e., 
concepts that are not inferentially connected to the concepts we actively 
use for deliberating. If it were possible to conceive of a group of represen-
tational structures similar to the concepts that figure in thoughts, yet are 
22. John McDowEll, Mind and World, 60.  
23. Ibid., 61.
24. Ibid., 62. 
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not available for reflection—i.e., these structures cannot figure in thoughts 
or beliefs and also cannot be used to access any content from long-term 
memory—then these structures could compose perceptual representa-
tions without undermining the claim that perception is independent from 
belief. Both Pylyshyn and, more recently, Fodor flirt with this possibility. 
The former claims that the perceptual system could work with a propri-
etary vocabulary to represent such “perceived properties as which regions 
of a scene go together as a single object, which contours go with which 
surfaces, which surfaces partially occlude other surfaces, and so on”.25 
The latter highlights that he does not see any reason for such general 
representations not to be taken as concepts: “why, in particular, shouldn’t 
mental representations that would be constituents of thoughts but for the 
constraints that a modular cognitive architecture imposes be good enough 
to qualify as concepts?”.26 
The question of what concepts are is a difficult one, and I do not 
intend to provide an answer to it in this article; however, more about the 
issue will be discussed later. McDowell would say that Fodor’s invocation 
of the concepts is “mere word-play”.27 Capabilities that are not potentially 
under the individual’s rational control cannot be genuinely understood 
as conceptual. A second reason for McDowell to reject the possibility 
contemplated by Fodor and Pylyshyn is his concern that experience can 
rationally constrain empirical thought. Thus, the concepts that operate 
passively in experience have to be the same as those that operate actively 
in thought and in judgment, since, as we observed above, they mediate 
the inferential connections that enable the subject to recognize the rele-
vance of the content of experience to the truth of a considered proposition. 
Thus, we either aggravate the interface problem if, according to Fodor 
and Pylyshyn, we embrace the independence thesis in a manner that 
disallows that the concepts operating passively in the experience can be 
the same as that we use in active thought, or we live together  with a threat 
of cognitive penetrability in experience if, like McDowell, we embrace the 
shared content thesis as he understands it in Mind and World. Once again, 
the dilemma from where we started.
The solution to this dilemma that I will explore is as follows. The 
shared content thesis involves the requirement that experience rationally 
25. Zenon pylysHyn, Seeing and Visualizing: It’s Not What You Think, 66. 
26. Jery foDoR, “Burge on Perception,” 213. 
27. John McDowEll, Mind and World, 62. 
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onstrains empirical thought. In other words, we have to understand how 
the subject can recognize the relevance of the perceptual content for a 
proposition considered. Content conceptualism explains how this recog-
nition is possible through inferential relations mediated by the concepts 
that would figure in the very content of experience and beliefs. This is 
not the only explanation possible, as I intend to show. I believe that Noë’s 
actionist theory of perception28 supplies us with elements for developing 
an explanation for this recognition that commits itself to, at best, state 
conceptualism, which will allow me to show how it is possible to simulta-
neously support the shared content and the independence claims. 
5. Conceptualism and the actionist theory of perception
In Action in Perception, Noë does not deny that perception is inde-
pendent from belief; what he denies is that the acceptance of this claim 
creates an obstacle to embracing conceptualism.29 He acknowledges that 
perception can be in disagreement with judgment, such as in illusion situ-
ations. In the excerpt cited in the third section above, he draws attention 
to its ability to disagree as the precise basis for perception’s relevance for 
judgment, noting that, similar to how they can disagree, they can also 
agree with each other. Noë then reminds us of something we have already 
mentioned: for perceptual content to be relevant to empirical thought and 
be able to enter into agreement or disagreement with it, perception must 
present the world to us as being a certain way. Moreover, the subject must 
be able to understand this content. Noë then claims that, 
one reason to think that perceptual experience is conceptual is that expe-
rience presents things to one as being this way or that; one needs an 
understanding of the ways experiences is presented as being.30 
Noë’s concern is to ensure that the things that we perceive or that 
are presented to us by experience can also be things about which we form 
28. In Action in Perception, Noë uses the term “enactive” and other cognates to qualify 
his theory, but he has recently started to use “actionist” and its cognates. See Alva 
noë, “Conceptual Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence,” in Open 
MIND: 27(T), eds. Thomas MEtzingER, and Jennifer winDt, 1-15. Frankfurt am Main: 
MIND Group, 2015. 
29. Alva noë, Action in Perception, 188. 
30. Ibid., 189.
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beliefs and have thoughts, since, without this, we would not understand 
how perception could agree or disagree with judgment. We have already 
seen how this kind of consideration led McDowell to support content 
conceptualism in Mind and World. Noë’s case seems different due to both 
the view of the concept that he proposes and the theory of perception 
that he sustains. I am going to briefly introduce his actionist theory of 
perception and argue that it requires only state conceptualism, which in 
turn is sufficient for supporting the shared content claim. I do not intend 
to defend Noë’s theory here, but rather to show how it can provide a good 
basis for developing an explanation for the justificational role of perceptual 
experience. 
The main claim of his theory is that perception is a way of acting, or, 
as he stated more recently, “perception is the activity of exploring the envi-
ronment making use of knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies”.31 To 
Noë, it is impossible to dissociate perception from the sensorimotor skills 
that allow us to move and interact with the world. Perceiving, he states, 
“is understanding the effect of movement on sensory stimulation”.32 It is 
not just a matter of noting that perception causally depends on senso-
rimotor skills, but rather that perceptual content itself is constituted by 
these skills.33 Without them, an individual would not be capable of under-
standing her sensory stimulus and, therefore, would not perceive anything 
at all. For example, that we perceive a tomato as being voluminous and 
three-dimensional, despite only being able to place one of its sides in our 
field of vision at any one time, is explained by the implicit understanding 
of how the tomato would seem if we moved in relation to it, i.e., by the 
implicit understanding of the dependence that the flow of sensations has 
on motor activity. This sensorimotor knowledge constitutes, therefore, the 
three-dimensional and voluminous aspect of the tomato that experience 
provides us with. In Noë’s words, 
You visually experience parts of the tomato that, strictly speaking, you 
do not see, because you understand, implicitly, that your sensory relation 
to those parts is mediated by familiar patterns of sensorimotor depen-
dence.34 
31. Alva noë, “Conceptual Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence,” 1. 
32. Alva noë, Action in Perception, 1.
33. Ibid., 2.
34. Ibid., 77.
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The sensorimotor skills are thus essential for a subject to be able 
to understand her own sensory stimulus, without which the surrounding 
world itself would not be presented  experientially. Another example 
is the way that we see a plate as being circular from an oblique angle, 
even though it looks elliptical. The plate’s circularity is provided to us 
through experience, due to the implicit understanding of how the plate 
would appear to us as we assume different positions in relation to it; we 
implicitly understand “the transformations the elliptical apparent shape 
(aspect) would undergo as we move.”35 This understanding is constituted 
by the sensorimotor skills that mediate our interactions with the plate and 
movements in relation to it. The appearance of an object from a particular 
position is not merely given to us; it also depends on sensorimotor skills 
in order to be understood. Understanding the elliptical appearance of the 
circular plate as seen from a certain position involves understanding that 
this appearance depends on the spatial relationship that we have with the 
plate, that it would stop or change if we moved or inclined our head, and 
that, for example, we would have to move our hand in a certain way to 
gasp the plate (if it were in reach), different from the way we would move 
our hand if the circular plate were in the center of our field of vision. 
Thus, from the bottom up, we can say that the appearance of an object 
becomes more intelligible to the extent that it connects to body’s actions 
directed at this object from a particular position, such as holding, pushing, 
approaching the object, and so on. One of the object’s properties, in turn—
such as the circularity of the plate or the tomato’s voluminous quality—is 
given to us by perception according to how a series of appearances of an 
object is collected, explored, and connected by sensorimotor skills carried 
out as we move in relation to that object. As Noë observed, “our grasp of 
the plate’s sensorimotor profile makes its shape available in experience.”36 
Action is constitutive of the content of perception to the extent that the 
sensory content of an experience is invested with spatial content by means 
of sensorimotor skills. Without these skills, effectively no object would be 
given to us in space.37 
 Noë proposes that we consider these sensorimotor skills as 
conceptual or proto-conceptual.38 He presents two reasons for this 
35. Ibid., 78. 
36. Ibid., 79.
37. Ibid., 95. 
38. Ibid., 199.
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proposal. The first is based on criticism that he presents regarding the 
understanding of acquiring concepts based on the model for explicit delib-
erate judgment. According to this model, the possesion a concept depends 
on the knowledge and ability to represent the criterion to apply this 
concept. This requirement is highly intellectualist and makes it difficult 
to explain not only the behavior of children but even that of adults. For 
example, someone can reliably recognize instances of modus ponens 
without knowing how to articulate the reason why modus ponens is a 
valid argument. That is, someone can be able to recognize an argument 
as being valid without knowing to express the reason why it is valid. It 
would be reasonable to say that this person possesses both the concept of 
modus ponens and that of validity, even though she is not able to explicitly 
represent the criteria that govern the application of these concepts. Daily 
practice that is sensitive to instances of modus ponens as legitimate argu-
ments is enough to attribute the concept of modus ponens to the indi-
vidual, even if the subject does not have a term for it or does not know 
how to articulate the criteria for its application. Thus, the possession of a 
concept must, according to Noë, be understood as the possession of some 
practical skills, and “some practical skills – some sensorimotor skills – are 
simple concepts, or so I propose.”39 
The second reason for Noë’s proposal is based on his commitment 
to the shared content claim. Noë states that perceptual experience must 
present the world as being a certain way, and that the subject must have 
an understanding of the way that the world is presented through expe-
rience if we desire to uphold the fact that experience can agree or disagree 
with empirical thought. In Noë’s theory, this understanding is enabled 
by sensorimotor skills. Without them, as we observed above, the subject 
would not be able to understand her own sensations. If we understand 
that these skills are conceptual, then the way that perceptual experience 
presents the world to us would also be conceptual. If sensorimotor skills 
are conceptual and necessary for the subject to understand her sensations, 
then possessing concepts is essential to having perceptual experiences. 
Thus, Noë’s theory of perception is conceptualist from the outset. I do 
not believe that Noë needs to commit to the content view; arguably, state 
view is sufficient and compatible with his claims. Sensorimotor skills of a 
certain type are necessary for the subject to have a perceptual state with 
certain content, for example, a perceptual state where the voluminous 
39. Ibid., 199. 
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aspect of the tomato is presented. The burden of proof lies with showing 
how the state view faces the interface problem. Without the content view, 
we can no longer appeal to the inferential connections to explain the 
justificational role of experience. I will address this difficulty later, but we 
must first evaluate Noë’s proposal of considering sensorimotor skills as 
conceptual skills. 
The question that the non-conceptualist can raise is whether Noë is 
correct in considering sensorimotor skills to be conceptual. Regarding his 
first motivation, we previously said that Noë criticizes the understanding 
of the possession of concepts by means of the explicit deliberate judgment 
model. Someone acquires a concept and learns to apply it correctly in 
different situations; similarly, someone acquires the skill of seeing the 
voluminous aspect of the tomato and assimilates the appropriate senso-
rimotor contingencies. In both cases, it is not necessary for the subject to 
be able to respectively represent the criteria that govern the application 
of the concept and the skills that incorporate these contingencies. It 
seems that this requirement for reflexiveness, made by the explicit delib-
erative judgment model, is in fact very intellectualist and rigorous, and 
if we dismiss this requirement, the convergence of sensorimotor skills 
and conceptual skills will not seem inadequate. However, this model sets 
another requirement that creates an obstacle for Noë’s analogy. Thoughts, 
whether they are explicit or not, are connected to each other, which means 
that we do not attribute to a subject the ability to formulate and entertain 
a certain proposition if the subject were not sensitive to the fact that the 
truth or falsehood of this proposition rationally constrains her to accept 
or reject other propositions. Someone who finds chocolate tasty must 
also find that it is edible. If a subject agrees to a statement expressing the 
first judgment and dissents to another expressing the second, we must 
conclude that either this subject did not understand the statements at issue, 
or she is unable to entertain and formulate the judgments at issue. This 
phenomenon of connection between thoughts and judgments is usually 
explained by the compositional nature of thought, i.e., by the fact that 
it is constituted by representational structures that satisfy Evans’s gener-
ality constraint.40 In this model, concepts are the very representations that 
40. According to Evans, our thoughts are structured by general representations that can 
be combined and recombined to form different thoughts. The thought that a is F is at 
the intersection of two series of thought: the series a is F, a is G, a is H, etc., and the 
series a is F, b is F, c is F, etc. A subject would thus be able to have the thought that a 
is F only if he had the ability to represent a under other predicates that he possesses 
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compose thoughts or are skills that enable us to have representations that 
compose thoughts. Noë’s analogy is thus weakened, since sensorimotor 
skills are not general, nor do they enter systematic relationships with one 
another to form other skills. The sensorimotor skill that enables someone 
to experience the voluminous aspect of apples when she has an apple in 
her vision field does not extend itself automatically to experiencing the 
voluminous aspect of other objects, since different objects will demand 
the assimilation of different sensorimotor contingencies. In fact, this skill 
does not even extend itself to experiencing the voluminous aspect of apples 
under any circumstance. If the environment is very dark, or too bright, or 
filled with dense fog, or if something suddenly conceals the apple, the skill 
at issue is not able to present us with the apple’s voluminous aspect. Thus, 
sensorimotor skills neither compose, nor are they general: rather, they 
are strongly dependent on context. Philosophers and psychologists who 
consider compositionality and generality as necessary traits of concepts 
will, thus, tend to reject Noë’s proposal.41 
A strategy favorable to Noë would be to weaken the requirement for 
generality that is imposed on the concepts.42 Another would be to appeal 
and the ability to represent F applied to other individuals that he is able to conceive. 
Concepts in this approach would be nothing more than the general representations 
required for explaining the systemic compositionality of thoughts. See Gareth Evans, 
The Varieties of Reference, 100.
41. It is worth citing Evans once again. Precisely for understanding that concepts compose 
and that certain audio stimuli gain spatial content due to the connection with body 
movements, Evans, unlike noë, draws the conclusion that the perceptual information 
system carries and manipulates non-conceptual content: “we can say, then, that 
auditory input […] acquires a (non-conceptual) spatial content for an organism by 
being linked with behavioral output in, presumably, advantageous way.” See Gareth 
Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 156.   
42. Noë himself appeals to the behavioral evidence of baboons that permitted the 
attribution of the following type of inference: S has a high social status in the group 
and R belongs to S’s family or subgroup, so R also has a high social status in the group. 
See Alva noë, Action in Perception, 185-187. Elizabeth Camp reports that behavioral 
evidence of a change in the social status of a baboon can make many others in the 
same family also lose social status and be treated accordingly, which would also be 
better explained by attributing minimal inferential skills to the baboons. This baboon 
probably lacks such general and structured conceptual skills as ours, yet he must have 
them to some degree. It could be that their ability to think about social hierarchies 
does not go beyond their conspecifics or even beyond their own group.  In this sense, 
their conceptual skills would create context-dependent representations, but even so 
they would not stop being compositional. See Elizabeth caMp, “A language of baboon 
thought,” in The Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed. Robert luRz (New York: Cambridge 
University Press,  2009), 112. 
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to cognitive phenomena that do not involve compositionality and that 
could be fruitfully explained by referring to the possession of practical 
skills of the kind that Noë understands as being concepts.43 However, I 
will not explore these strategies. As I have already stated, I do not intend 
to offer a solution to the concept’s problem. Below, I present Noë’s most 
recent position on the topic, and I will then address the central epistemo-
logical question of this article. 
Given the difficulty in reconciling into a single model the senso-
rimotor skills—which are context-dependent and not compositional—and 
the skills involved in deliberative judgment—which are compositional 
and general—Noë recently proposed a pluralist approach in relation to 
the nature of the concepts, unified only by a functional characterization 
of them. Concepts must be understood as skills of access, i.e., “concepts, 
I propose, should be thought of as techniques of enabling access to what 
there is”44,“they are rather skills for taking hold of what there is”45, and 
there are different modes of access, each of them conferring a different 
way of understanding what is there. Noë distinguishes at least three 
modes of access or understanding: the perceptual mode, the active mode, 
and the judgmental mode. Each of these modes involves cooperation and 
the performance of different techniques and skills through which we keep 
in touch with what is there and carry out different tasks with what exists. 
These modes of access and understanding, although they could be related, 
43. Some psychologists distinguish perceptual categories from conceptual categories, 
stating that this distinction captures the contrast between knowing what something 
looks like and knowing what something is, which often already involves some 
understanding of their underlying nature. The first knowledge is only based on 
perceptual qualities and the sensorimotor skills used in the interaction with objects, 
whereas the second involves the representation of the imperceptible qualities, beliefs 
about how the object behaves, or, if it is animate, beliefs about which actions he is able 
to perform, in addition to giving us information about the kind of object that is being 
represented and its relationship with other things. See Jean ManDlER, “Perceptual and 
conceptual process in infancy,” Jornal of Cognition and Development 1, (2000): 6-8, and 
Quinn, paul, and Peter EiMas, “A reexamination of the perceptual-to-conceptual shift 
in mental representations,” Review of General Psychology 1, no. 3 (1997): 273. In any 
case, we can say that perceptual categories, heavily based on sensorimotor skills, are 
appropriate for explaining discrimination and recognition skills that children exhibit 
at an early age. These early skills normally do not compose. For example, a child can be 
able to recognize food and fish, but not fish food. See Daniel wEiskopf, “Observational 
Concepts,” in The Conceptual Mind: New Directions in the Study of Concepts, ed. Eric 
MaRgolis, and Stephen lauREncE (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015 ), 227-243.  
44. Alva noë, “Conceptual Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence,” 2.
45. Alva noë, Varieties of Presence (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012), 35. 
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are not reduced or subordinated to just one type of access. Perceptual 
access, for example, does not have to be led or helped by the judgmental 
mode of understanding. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to assume 
that the structures involved to understand deliberate judgment—e.g. 
general representations—are more paradigmatic of what concepts are than 
the other structures involved in explaining the perceptual or active modes 
of access. As an access technique to keep us aware and in touch with what 
there is, sensorimotor skills meet all the necessary requirements, no less 
than judgment and thought. By way of illustration, in relation to a dog, 
we can access it and express understanding of its nature in different ways: 
The idea that understanding a concept is mastery of a technique, a mastery 
that has multiple, distinct, context-sensitive ways of finding expression, 
helps here. One way to express understanding of dog is to talk and write 
about dogs. Another way is to be able to spot dogs on the basis of their 
appearance. Still another is to work or play comfortably with dogs. And 
the list goes on and on. We put our singular understanding of what dogs 
are to work in these different ways, and the understanding consists in the 
ability to do (more or less) all of that.46
Noë illustrates, in this order, the judgmental, perceptual, and active 
modes of understanding in relation to the dog. Returning to the discussion 
on the type of conceptualism Noë is committed to, it is now clear that he 
dispenses with the content view. The judgmental mode of understanding 
does not have to be generalized or extended to the other modes of under-
standing, such as the perceptual. Concepts in the perceptual mode of under-
standing place us in direct contact with things, but they are not general 
representations. The content of a perception is not a proposition.47 Can we 
say that he supports the state view? I believe so, but with some caveats. 
The statement, “You can’t see the laser-projector if you don’t know what a 
laser-projector is”,48 would normally be an expression of commitment to 
state conceptualism: a subject cannot see x without possessing the concept 
of x. However, we must emphasize that Noë, since his Varieties of Presence 
(2012), rejects that perceptual states are or involve representations, unlike 
in his earlier Action in Perception (2006), where his formulations remained 
protean in this respect. He now adopts a relational view of perception.49 In 
46. Alva noë, “Conceptual Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence,” 11.
47. Ibid., 3. 
48. Ibid., 13. 
49. Alva noë, Varieties of Presence, 25.  For a introduction to and a more deep discussion of 
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this sense, his most recent position is not adjusted to the initial definition 
of state view. If we broaden this definition to incorporate dependence of 
perception on concepts, such as Noë understands them, then Noë is a 
state conceptualist in the sense that, to have a perceptual act in which the 
apple and its voluminous aspect are presented to us, we must have a skill 
of access, i.e., appropriate sensorimotor skills that allow us to maintain 
contact with the apple if one is in the field of vision. As he suggests, “Think 
of the concept in perception not as a category, or a representation, but 
a way of directly picking up what is there”50 and “to say that perceptual 
experience is conceptual, from this standpoint, is to say that perceptual 
experience is a skillful grappling with what there is”.51
Now, I am going to show how this approach to concepts and 
perception help us to explain the justificational role of perceptual expe-
rience. When discussing the distinct modes of access and understanding, 
Noë forgoes the inferential relations between experience and thought that 
McDowell explored in Mind and World. Without them, we aggravate the 
problem of interface, or we no longer have an explanation for how the 
second requirement of the shared content thesis is satisfied.
6. The justificational role of sensorimotor skills
Initially, we can observe that the first requirement of the shared 
content thesis is easily satisfied by Noë’s actionist theory of perception 
and his conception of concepts as skills of access. What we access directly 
through the perceptual mode of understanding can be equally accessed 
by the judgmental mode of understanding. The reverse need not be true, 
since we can access abstract or non-observable entities through the judg-
mental mode of understanding, but not through the perceptual mode of 
understanding. For our purposes, it is sufficient that part of empirical 
thought can be directly and rationally constrained by experience. These 
skills of access, by putting us in touch with what there is, express, through 
the peculiar way that each of them establishes and maintains this contact, 
an understanding of the nature of what exists. We will further discuss 
this understanding later, but it is important to keep in mind that we 
the relational view, see John caMpbEll, Reference and Consciousness (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 114-131. 
50. Alva noë, “Conceptual Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence,” 11.
51. Alva noë, Varieties of Presence, 35. 
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have already left behind the view that something has been given to us 
in experience or in thought in a purely passive manner. I dispense with 
the “myth of the given” as much as do Sellars and McDowell. According 
to the actionist theory of perception, having something present through 
perception or thought is a cognitive achievement; it is the result of the 
exercise of a skill of access.
The independence thesis is also vindicated by Noë’s actionist theory 
of perception. The sensorimotor skills do not seem to be cognitively pene-
trated by beliefs, since the conceptual and inferential connections that pose 
a threat to McDowell’s position in Mind and World are not present in Noë’s 
position. The sensorimotor skills are not cognitively penetrated, even by 
other sensorimotor skills, since they do not enter into compositional rela-
tions. However, someone could claim that sensorimotor skills, since they 
are learned and flexible—i.e., sensitive to new situations—are cognitively 
penetrated. This point needs to be examined. The learning and fine tuning 
of sensorimotor skills depends more on interaction with the environment 
than the background knowledge that the subject already has. In fact, since 
they constitutively involve a very fine-tuned adjustment between the reper-
toire of body actions that the subject is able to perform and the presence 
of a certain kind of object in the surroundings, sensorimotor skills result 
much more from the continuous and systematic interaction with this kind 
of object than from beliefs and other superior cognition that can indirectly 
support or guide the acquisition of these skills. The possession of a skill 
depends constitutively on success. Just like an archer’s apprentice does 
not have the skill to launch an arrow into the bullseye while repeatedly 
missing the mark by far, even in favorable environmental conditions, we 
also do not learn to see the voluminous aspect of the apple or the circu-
larity of the plate as long as we are unable to grasp, hold, follow, or track 
the apple or plate in our field of vision with relative success. A skill is 
a disposition or a set of dispositions that results in success if exercised 
in suitable conditions. The case of sensorimotor skills is no different. 
Therefore, even though there can be indirect cognitive influence on the 
learning of a cognitive skill, it is irrelevant to the independence thesis. 
Having a sensorimotor skill for accessing apples means that, when it is 
exercised in the appropriate conditions, the subject directly sees the apple 
that is in her vision field and its voluminous aspect. The apple itself and 
its voluminous aspect are present for the subject through her experience. 
It is not a representation that could or could not be correct, which, then, 
would threaten the independence thesis. As techniques for access, senso-
rimotor skills, once acquired, reliably place us in direct contact with the 
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surrounding environment. Thus, we can conclude that, even though there 
could be some cognitive influences on the acquisition of these skills, the 
result of the exercise of a sensorimotor skill in appropriate conditions, 
because it is not a representation, is not itself cognitively penetrated. 
The  independence claim is thus guaranteed. As we stated above, what 
it requires is that perceptual experience presents the world as it really is. 
What remains to be explained now is how the second requirement of 
the shared content thesis is satisfied. The surrounding world is presented 
to us intelligibly through perception, i.e., manifesting a type of under-
standing of the world; but the world is not, through perception, presented 
propositionally. The judgmental mode of understanding presents the 
world to us, the same world, propositionally. However, how can the 
subject recognize the relevance of what is perceptually presented to her 
to what she thinks about the world when she entertains a proposition? 
In principle, we could be led to think that these modes of access, since 
they are different—i.e., not reducible to one another—do not maintain any 
type of rational relationship between each other. If this were the case, the 
problem of the interface would seem unsolvable. It is not quite so, as I will 
now seek to show.
First, the recognition of a truth-indicating relationship is not exem-
plified by thoughts only. It is true that if p implies q, the recognition of the 
relevance of p for the truth of q is exemplified by the occurring belief that p 
implies q. However, this recognition could also be manifested by the indi-
vidual’s inferential practice of extracting q whenever authorized to assume 
p or to believe p. The ability to explicitly represent this relationship of 
implication is not necessary for possessing the skill of identifying and 
being sensitive to this relationship. In fact, for reasons similar to those 
presented by Ryle for the priority of knowing-how in relation to know-
ing-that52, it seems much more reasonable that the belief that p implies 
q can only be legitimately attributed to a subject if the subject is capable 
of responding appropriately to instances of the implication relationship 
at issue in different inferential contexts. Thus, the exercise of the ability 
to identify the relationship of implication between p and q is enough to 
manifest the recognition of the relevance of p for the truth of q. We have 
not yet addressed the interface problem, since, in the case at hand, we 
are dealing with the recognition of the logical or conceptual relationships 
52. See Gilbert RylE, “Knowing How and Knowing That,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 46, (1945): 1-16. 
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between propositions. Nevertheless, I propose to dispense with the explicit 
deliberation as a necessary condition for the recognition of a truth-indi-
cating relationship. In other words, the exercise of skills can be sufficient 
for explaining how an individual’s mental state can provide a reason for 
believing. In the case at hand, the ability to recognize that p implies q, 
when exercised correctly, gives the subject a reason to believe in  q given p. 
The acquisition of a sensorimotor repertoire of skills that is broad 
enough to make us capable of accessing and exploring the surrounding 
world provides what I propose to call the space of actions or affordances,53 
in contrast to the Sellars’s logical space of reasons. A subject in possession 
of sensorimotor skills is in a world structured by the possibility of actions 
in which the subject moves to carry out her needs. If I am walking in a 
muddy area and I want to avoid the mud at all costs, some parts of the 
ground will be seen as firmer than others, not in the sense that I classify 
them as being “firm,” but rather in the sense that I prepare for or am 
willing to step on these parts. If I am tired and seeking a place to rest, a 
wooden stump in the area will invite me to rest upon it. The set of possi-
bilities for actions or affordances that an object offers in relation to the 
individual’s skills constitutes the perceptual understanding that she has of 
this object. This understanding mediates the way that the object is percep-
tually presented. The object is not simply given to us; it is presented as 
being a certain way, i.e., as being an object that requests or allows a series 
of affordances. This understanding is still not propositional, but it is rich 
enough for us to say that the object and its properties are, to the individual 
with the appropriate sensorimotor skills, situated in the space of actions. 
The capacity to situate an object in the space of actions implies having 
a kind of understanding of the nature of this object, which is not proposi-
tional. For example, the sensorimotor skills by which we access an apple 
in the environment does not by itself give us propositional knowledge that 
the apple in the field of vision is red. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that 
those sensorimotor skills, when exercised in the appropriated conditions, 
53. The technical term “affordance” was introduced by James Gibson and designates 
a relationship between the organism and the environment; “the affordances of the 
environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill”, depending on the skills of the animal and its body features. Certain 
protuberances on a hill help a professional climber, who will be able to apply the 
necessary push on them to climb, but they are of no use to a beginner. Some surfaces—
for example, the surface of a lake—do not afford human walking but do afford the 
ambulation of some insects. See James gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception: Classic Edition (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2015), 119.
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give us direct access to the apple and some understanding of the nature 
of the apple. This understanding is manifested in the repertory of bodily 
actions that the subject is able to exercise in relation to the apple and in 
the set of tasks that the subject is able to accomplish in which this kind of 
object is involved. In order to have this kind of perceptual understanding, 
it is not necessary that the subject be able to understand those bodily 
actions and those tasks through the judgmental mode of understanding. 
It is enough that the subject possesses the appropriate sensorimotor skills 
and exercises them in the appropriate conditions. I agree with Sellars that 
a red sensation does not give us the non-inferential knowledge that some-
thing is red. However, the appropriate sensorimotor skills give us direct 
access to red objects in the environment and an understanding of their 
nature. This understanding is manifested, for example, in the exercise 
of sensorimotor skills through which we track red objects even in the 
conditions of illumination variation or in that exercise through which we 
discriminate red objects from blue ones. 
Direct access to the objects in the environment and the space of 
actions in which we intelligibly situate these objects serve as a gateway for 
introducing observational concepts, now understood in the judgmental 
mode of understanding, i.e., as general representations. Observational 
concepts, according to Daniel Weiskopf, “are those that are spontaneously 
made available at the interface between perception-action systems and the 
conceptual system”,54 or, to use Noë’s terminology, at the interface between 
understanding in the perceptual mode and in the judgmental mode.55 The 
observational concepts are causally connected to the perceptual states, 
i.e., they are normally caused by exercising the sensorimotor skills. One 
type of perceptual state resulting from the exercise of certain senso-
rimotor skills—for example, those that enable us to access the apple—is 
associated with the symbol APPLE. Since the observational concepts are 
also a skill, the perceptual state, for example, the access to the apple, does 
not invariably cause the occurrence of the corresponding observational 
concept. The application of the concept depends on other relative condi-
tions related to the subject’s attention, motivation, and thoughts that she 
54. Daniel wEiskopf, “Observational Concepts,” 223. 
55. The idea that possessing observational concepts that meet Evans’s generalization 
condition must be explained by perceptual discrimination skills that do not involve 
general representations themselves, in this sense, can also be found in Bermúdez. 
See José bERMúDEz, “What is at stake in the debate on nonconceptual content?,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 21, (2007): 55-72.
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may be entertaining. Thus, we can perceptually access an apple without 
classifying it as such by means of an observational concept, and we can 
think about an apple through the observational concept APPLE without 
accessing it perceptually. Essentially, these concepts fulfill two functions: 
(a) they make it possible to think about an object when it is no longer 
accessible through the perceptual mode, and (b) they also make it possible 
to extend our understanding on the nature of the object by allowing us to 
place it in relation to other objects and properties that are also inacces-
sible through the perceptual mode. These two functions are related to the 
characteristic of generality that are not available in the perceptual mode. 
The ability to access an object through the perceptual mode is highly 
dependent on context. Thus, the token APPLE could be triggered, even 
in the absence of its associated perceptual state, and can be used to relate 
the apple to other things beyond the bodily actions that, in the perceptual 
mode, would be available to establish and maintain perceptual access to 
the apple. 
Learning an observational concept56 is highly dependent on the 
perceptual mode of understanding, since the paradigmatic cases for its 
applicability are the objects accessed perceptually by means of the senso-
rimotor skills with which the concepts is causally associated. Observational 
concepts are thus introduced; they would not be observational if they did 
not have this strong restriction on their application. The rational rela-
tionship between a perceptual state and a thought is not, in fact, infer-
ential or quasi-inferential. It is a substantial relationship, since the object 
accessed perceptually is what makes the application of the corresponding 
observational concept correct, in a great number of cases and fundamen-
tally in the paradigmatic ones. The identity of an observational concept 
is given in part by the sensorimotor skills with which it is associated; in 
this sense, the association between sensorimotor skills and observational 
concepts are of a constitutive nature. Thus, the perception of an apple 
serves as a reason for the belief of the subject that there is an apple in 
the field of vision, to the extent that when applying the APPLE concept to 
think about the object that she accesses perceptually, she exercises a skill 
whose acquisition involved taking that kind of object to be paradigmatic 
56. The discussion about what is and what is not observational is important if we want 
to answer the question of how directly empirical thought as a whole can be rationally 
constrained by experience; however, in this article, I only aim at the more modest issue 
of suggesting how this rational constraint is possible. For more on this debate, see 
Daniel wEiskopf, “Observational Concepts,” 229-233.
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for the application of this concept. Acquiring an observational concept 
involves assimilating the commitment to treating a certain kind of object 
or property, accessible through the perceptual mode of understanding, 
as paradigmatic for its application. The recognition of the rational rela-
tionship between the perception of an object and the belief in which 
the observational concept of this object figures does not need to involve 
the thought that this object is an instance of this concept; the fact that 
the concept at issue has been adequately exercised is sufficient, i.e., in 
response to the perceptual access to an object of the kind with which the 
concept is associated. As we have already argued, the exercise of a skill can 
be enough to explain the recognition of a truth-indicating relationship. 
This relationship is not, at the interface between perception and empirical 
thought, instantiated by an inferential or quasi-inferential relationship, as 
McDowell thought of in Mind and World, but rather by a substantial rela-
tionship; i.e., the content of our thought is satisfied by what is presented 
to us perceptually, and the recognition of this relationship expresses itself 
in the very exercise of the observational concept which figures in thought. 
7. Concluding remarks
Empirical thought is constrained by perceptual experience not in 
virtue of its propositional content, that would hold inferential relations 
with empirical beliefs, but mainly in virtue of the fact that perceptual 
experience gives us direct access to objects and properties that satisfy 
observational concepts introduced and learned in strong connection with 
the space of actions. When these concepts are applied in the formation 
or maintenance of a judgment in response to the appropriate perceptual 
experience, the exercise of the conceptual skill in question manifests the 
recognition that the objects accessed through this experience satisfy the 
observational concepts which figure in the judgment. The internalism 
defended is minimal, since it is not required that the subject be able to 
elaborate this recognition in the judgmental mode of understanding. So, 
we can be internalists without being intellectualists. The shared content 
thesis does not require the content conceptualism and can be reconciled 
with the claim that perception is independent from belief. The latter claim, 
in its turn, is compatible with the influence of belief on learning senso-
rimotor skills to the extend that the result from the exercise of those skills 
in the appropriate conditions could be taken as implying a direct access 
to surrounding objects and their properties. In this paper, the actionist 
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theory of perception was not defended from empirical and conceptual 
objections.57 I have assumed its plausibility in order to elaborate an expla-
nation for the justificational role of perceptual experience.
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